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The	“me”	in	the	machine	
What	might	we	discover	about	being	human	by	giving	a	robot	a	sense	of	self?	
Tony	Prescott	is	finding	out	
What	is	the	self?	Rene	Descartes	encapsulated	one	idea	of	it	in	the	1600s	when	
he	wrote:	“I	think,	therefore	I	am”.	He	saw	the	self	as	irreducible	and	constant,	
the	essence	of	his	being,	on	which	his	knowledge	of	everything	else	was	built.	
Others	have	very	different	views.	Writing	a	century	later,	David	Hume	argued	
that	there	was	no	“simple	and	continued”	self	through	which	he	experienced	the	
world,	just	the	flow	of	his	experience.	Hume’s	proposal	resonates	with	Buddhist	
teaching	concerning	the	anattā,	or	non-self,	which	contends	that	the	idea	of	an	
unchanging	self	is	both	an	illusion	and	at	the	root	of	much	human	unhappiness.		
Today,	a	growing	number	of	philosophers	and	psychologists	subscribe	to	the	
school	of	thought	that	the	self	is	an	illusion.	But	even	if	the	centuries-old	idea	of	
self	as	essential	and	unchanging	is	misleading,	there	is	still	much	to	explain.	How	
you	distinguish	your	body	from	the	rest	of	the	world,	for	example.	Why	you	
experience	the	world	from	a	specific	perspective	–	typically,	somewhere	in	the	
middle	of	your	head.	How	you	remember	yourself	in	the	past	or	imagine	yourself	
in	the	future.	How	you	are	able	to	conceive	of	the	world	from	another’s	point-of-
view.	I	believe	that	science	is	close	to	explaining	many	of	these	things.		
The	key	is	the	insight	that	the	self	should	be	considered	not	as	an	essence	but	as	
a	set	of	processes	–	a	process	being	a	virtual	machine	running	inside	a	physical	
one,	as	when	a	program	runs	on	a	computer.	In	a	similar	way,	some	of	the	
activity	in	the	brain	constitutes	processes	that	generate	the	human	self.	This	fits	
with	Hume’s	intuition	that	if	you	stop	thinking	the	self	vanishes	along	with	the	
content	of	your	thoughts.	So,	for	instance,	when	you	fall	asleep,	“you”,	as	an	
entity	brought	into	being	by	a	set	of	active	brain	processes,	cease	to	exist.	
However,	when	you	awake,	those	same	processes	are	rekindled,	picking	up	much	
where	they	left	off,	and	providing	a	subjective	experience	of	continuity.	
The	idea	that	the	self	emerges	from	a	set	of	processes	is	also	what	has	
encouraged	my	colleagues	and	I	to	believe	we	can	recreate	it	in	a	robot.	By	
deconstructing	the	self	and	then	attempting	to	build	it	up	again	piece-by-piece,	
we	are	learning	more	about	what	selfhood	is.	This	is	an	on-going	collaboration	
with	researchers	in	several	European	institutes,	and	admittedly	we	still	have	a	
way	to	go.	But	I’m	confident	we	can	create	an	artificial	self	–	or	at	least	as	much	
of	a	self	as	we	would	like	in	a	robot.	We	believe	our	work	will	help	resolve	the	
mystery	at	the	heart	of	self	–	that	it	feels	both	compellingly	real	and	yet,	when	
examined	closely,	seems	to	dissolve	away.		
Meet	iCub,	a	state-of-the-art	humanoid,	the	robot	in	which	we	are	creating	this	
sense	of	self.	iCub	has	vision,	hearing,	touch	and	a	proprioceptive	sense	that	
allows	it	to	coordinate	its	53	joints.	It	can	speak	and	interact	with	its	world,	and	
it	improves	its	performance	by	learning.	There	are	currently	30	such	robots	in	
research	labs	around	the	world.	At	Sheffield	Robotics	our	iCub	has	a	control	
system	modeled	on	the	brain,	so	that	it	“thinks”	in	ways	similar	to	you	and	me.		
Starting	from	the	premise	that	the	self	consists	of	a	collection	of	processes,	we	
first	had	to	consider	exactly	how	we	might	deconstruct	selfhood	in	order	to	build	
it	up	in	a	machine.	Philosophy,	psychology	and	neuroscience	have	provided	
many	insights	into	what	constitutes	the	human	self,	and	how	to	recognise	and	
measure	aspects	of	self	in	adults,	infants,	even	animals.		Our	attempt	to	construct	
a	robot	self	begins	with	psychology,	but	we	will	see	that	it	can	also	be	mapped	
onto	our	growing	understanding	of	how	the	psychological	self	emerges	from	the	
brain.	
William	James,	a	founding	father	of	modern	psychology,	suggested	that	the	self	
can	be	divided	into	“I”	and	“me”	–	the	former	comprising	the	experience	of	being	
a	self,	the	latter	the	set	of	ideas	you	have	about	your	self,	or	the	content	that	is	
experienced	by	the	“I”.	In	the	1990s,	Ulric	Neisser,	the	father	of	modern	cognitive	
psychology,	went	further.	Beginning	with	different	categories	of	self-knowledge,	
he	identified	five	key	aspects	of	self:	the	ecological	or	physically	situated	self,	the	
interpersonal	self,	the	temporally	extended	self,	the	conceptual	self	and	the	
private	self.	Neisser’s	analysis	is	not	the	final	word,	but	it	provides	a	perspective	
that	is	grounded	in	our	understanding	of	human	cognitive	development,	that	was	
missing	in	classical	philosophical	views	of	the	self	such	as	those	of	Hume	and	
Descartes.	It	has	also	provided	some	useful	clues	about	what	might	be	required	
to	build	up	an	artificial	self	process-by-process.	
How	have	we	gone	about	creating	these	self	processes	for	our	robot?	We	use	an	
approach	called	neurorobotics,	which	means	we	incorporate	knowledge	about	
how	real	brains	work	into	our	programing.	So	our	iCub’s	control	system	is	
designed	to	emulate	key	processes	found	in	the	mammalian	brain.	And	the	
interactions	between	these	simulated	brain	processes	are	governed	by	an	
architecture	called	“Distributed	Adaptive	Control”	developed	by	my	colleague	
Paul	Verschure	at	the	Catalan	Institute	of	Advanced	Research	in	Barcelona,	Spain,	
which	is	modelled	on	the	cognitive	architecture	found	in	the	brain.	
Now,	say	we	want	to	start	building	a	process	that	emulates	the	human	ecological	
self.	A	key	aspect	of	this	is	an	awareness	of	ones	body	and	how	it	interacts	with	
the	world.	To	achieve	this,	iCub	needs	an	internal	“body	schema”	–	a	process	that	
maintains	a	model	of	its	physical	parts	and	the	geometry	of	its	current	body	pose.	
Rather	than	programing	the	body	schema	directly,	as	other	roboticists	might	do,	
we	have	given	iCub	the	capacity	to	work	it	out.	Its	programing	allows	it	to	learn	
by	generating	small,	random	movements	and	observing	the	consequences	these	
have	with	its	various	sensors.	A	similar	kind	of	exploratory	behaviour	—	termed	
“motor	babbling”	—	is	seen	in	human	babies,	both	in	the	womb	and	in	early	
infancy,	suggesting	that	people	learn	about	their	bodies	in	much	the	same	way.	
Using	this	approach,	Giorgio	Metta	and	colleagues	at	the	Italian	Institute	of	
Technology	in	Genoa,	Italy,	are	training	our	iCub	to	distinguish	self	from	other,	a	
fundamental	aspect	of	the	ecological	self.	The	motor	babbling	program	also	
allows	the	robot	to	learn	how	to	move	to	achieve	a	specific	target	pose.	
Combining	this	body	model	with	knowledge	of	objects	and	surfaces	in	nearby	
space	enables	iCub	to	move	around	without	colliding	into	things.		
Then	there’s	the	temporally	extended	self.	Insights	about	what	this	entails	can	be	
found	in	the	case	of	a	young	man	we	will	know	as	N.N.	who,	as	the	result	of	an	
accident	in	the	1980s,	lost	his	long-term	memory	for	new	experiences.	This	
damage	to	his	brain	also	left	him	completely	without	foresight.	He	described	
trying	to	imagine	his	future	as	“like	swimming	in	the	middle	of	a	lake.	There	is	
nothing	there	to	hold	you	up	or	do	anything	with.”	In	losing	his	past,	N.N.	had	
also	lost	his	future.	His	ecological	self	remained	intact,	but	we	could	say	that	it	
had	become	“marooned	in	the	present”.		
The	ability	to	think	about	the	self	in	time	also	poses	a	problem	for	our	robot.	
Although	we	can	channel	all	its	sensory	input	into	a	large	capacity	hard-drive,	
iCub	also	needs	to	be	able	to	decide	how	best	to	use	this	information	when	trying	
to	make	sense	of	the	present.	Peter	Dominey	and	his	group	at	Inserm	in	Lyon	
have	addressed	this	problem	by	encoding	iCub’s	interactions	with	objects	and	
people	in	a	way	that	allows	it	to	more	clearly	see	their	relevance	to	present	
situations.	However,	their	model	uses	standard	computing	techniques,	so	we	are	
now	working	with	them	to	create	a	neurorobotic	version.	This	will	directly	
emulate	processing	in	brain	areas,	such	as	the	hippocampus,	that	are	known	to	
be	important	for	human	autobiographical	memory	function.		
Recent	brain	imaging	studies	have	confirmed	N.N.’s	experience	that	the	same	
brain	systems	underlie	both	our	ability	to	recall	past	events	and	to	imagine	what	
the	future	might	bring.	Our	hope	is	that	a	model	of	the	temporal	self	will	provide	
iCub	with	contextual	information	from	the	past	that	will	help	it	to	better	
understand	its	current	experience.	This,	in	turn,	should	allow	it	to	better	predict	
what	could	happen	next.		
Thinking	about	self	as	a	set	of	processes,	it	becomes	clear	that	some	of	these	
processes	are	connected.	For	example,	a	key	aspect	of	the	interpersonal	self	is	
empathy.	Empathy	derives	from	a	general	ability	to	imagine	oneself	in	another’s	
shoes.	One	way	to	do	this	is	to	internally	simulate	what	you	perceive	to	be	their	
situation	by	using	the	internal	model	that	underlies	your	own	ecological	self.	So	
the	interpersonal	self	could	grow	out	of	the	ecological	self.	But	what	more	is	
needed?	We	are	working	on	what	we	consider	to	be	an	important	building	block,	
the	capacity	to	learn	by	imitation.	
Your	ability	to	interpret	another	person’s	actions	using	your	own	body	schema	is	
partly	down	to	mirror	neurons	–	cells	in	your	brain	that	fire	both	when	you	
perform	a	given	movement	and	when	you	see	someone	else	perform	it.	Using	
this	insight,	Yiannis	Demiris	at	Imperial	College	London	has	extended	iCub’s	
motor	babbling	program	into	an	imitation	learning	system.	As	a	result,	iCub	can	
rapidly	acquire	new	hand	gestures,	and	learn	sequences	of	actions	involved	in	
playing	games	or	solving	puzzles,	simply	by	watching	people	perform	these	tasks.	
To	achieve	empathy	will	require	extending	the	system	further	so	that	iCub	
recognises	and	mirrors	both	the	physical	(movement)	and	emotional	state	of	the	
person	being	observed.		
There	is	still	plenty	to	do.	Our	models	of	the	ecological,	interpersonal	and	
temporal	selves	are	undoubtedly	crude	in	comparison	to	what	goes	in	human	
brains.	And	we	have	yet	to	tackle	the	conceptual	and	private	selves	that	would	
provide	iCub	with	knowledge	of	what	(or	who)	it	is,	and	an	awareness	that	it	has	
an	internal	world	not	shared	by	others.	As	and	when	we	meet	the	challenge	to	
make	iCub’s	self	processes	more	realistic,	there	may	be	some	aspects	of	the	
human	self	that	we	will	not	want	to	emulate.	For	example,	the	robot’s	
motivations	and	goals	are	essentially	those	we	design	in,	and	it	might	be	wise	to	
leave	things	that	way	rather	than	allow	them	to	evolve	over	time	as	they	do	in	
people.	
Something	else	holding	us	back	is	iCub’s	limited	understanding	of	language.	
Although	our	robot	can	recognise	speech	this	is	not	the	same	as	understanding	
meaning,	which	requires	relating	words	to	action	and	objects.	Our	colleagues	in	
Lyon	are	working	on	a	neurorobotic	solution	to	this	problem	but	for	the	moment	
iCub	is	only	capable	of	two-way	conversations	on	a	few	topics,	such	as	the	game	
that	it	is	currently	playing	with	you.	
That	said,	even	now,	we	can	see	the	practical	potential	of	robots	of	this	kind.	The	
ecological	self	makes	our	iCub	safer	to	be	around.	The	temporally	extended	self	
allows	it	to	remember	the	past	and	so	be	better	prepared	for	the	future.	The	
interpersonal	self	allows	it	to	conceive	of,	and	anticipate,	human	needs	and	
actions.	Such	a	robot	could	usefully	work	alongside	people	in	many	fields	from	
manufacturing	and	search-and-rescue	to	helping	care	for	people	with	disabilities.		
You	might	argue	that	in	considering	what	is	required	to	create	a	sense	of	self	we	
have	missed	a	crucial	element,	the	“I”	at	centre	of	William	James’	notion	of	self—
what	we	also	call	consciousness.	But	one	possibility	is	that	consciousness	
happens	when	the	other	aspects	of	self	are	brought	together,	in	other	words,	it	
may	be	an	emergent	property	of	a	suitably	configured	set	of	self	processes,	
rather	than	a	distinct	thing	in	itself.		Returning	to	the	Buddhist	idea	of	the	self	as	
an	illusion,	when	you	strip	away	the	different	component	processes	that	make	
up	the	self	perhaps	there	will	be	nothing	left.			
Our	idea	of	the	self	is	intimately	tied-up	with	our	notion	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	
person.	Is	it	conceivable,	then,	that	one	day	we	might	attribute	personhood	to	a	
robot	with	an	artificial	sense	of	self?		Philosopher	John	Locke,	writing	in	the	17th	
century,	defined	a	person	as	an	entity	with	reason	and	language,	possessing	
mental	states	such	as	beliefs,	desires	and	intentions,	capable	of	relationships,	
and	morally	responsible	for	its	actions.	Modern	philosopher	Daniel	Dennett	at	
Tufts	University	in	Boston	largely	agrees,	but	with	an	important	addition.	A	
person,	he	says,	is	someone	who	is	treated	as	a	person	by	others.	So,	personhood	
is	something	we	grant	to	one	another.		
Note	that	neither	Locke	nor	Dennett	require	that	a	person	to	be	made	of	
biological	stuff.	This	leaves	open	the	possibility	that	there	might,	one	day,	be	an	
artificial	entity	to	which	we	attribute	personhood.		Even	so,	at	this	stage	our	iCub	
falls	short	of	the	required	criteria.		iCub’s	artificial	self	can	reason,	use	language,	
have	beliefs,	intentions,	and	enter	into	relationships	of	a	kind.	We	might	even	be	
inclined	to	judge	it	for	the	appropriateness	of	its	actions.			However,	our	iCub	
does	not	yet	have	the	full	set	of	processes	associated	with	a	human	self,	so	we	
cannot	be	sure	that	its	mental	states	are	anything	like	ours.	Neither	is	it	a	moral	
being	–	at	least	not	as	we	commonly	think	of	them	–	because	it	does	not	base	its	
choices	on	values.		On	the	other	hand,	our	everyday	attribution	of	personhood	is	
grounded	more	in	direct	impressions	than	on	a	philosophical	checklist.	As	
Dennett	says,	personhood	is	partly	in	the	eyes	of	the	beholder.	And,	when	
interacting	with	iCub,	it	can	feel	natural	to	behave	towards	this	robot	as	though	
we	are	taking	the	first	steps	towards	creating	a	new	kind	of	person.	Sometimes	it	
even	leaves	me	with	the	surprising	feeling	that	“someone	is	home”.	
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